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Technology Transfer through Water Partnerships 
A Radical Framework of Assessment for Legitimacy 
 




“In the imagination of the twentieth century, water lost both its power to 
communicate by touch its deep-seated purity and its mystical power to wash off 
blemish. It has become and industrial and technical detergent.” 
Ivan Illich, H2O and the Waters of Forgetfulness, p.75 
 
 
In the run-up to the Johannesburg Summit, water was declared one of the five major issue 
areas (the WEHAB1) "in which progress is possible with the resources and technologies at our 
disposal today" as Secretary-General Kofi Annan would put it (Rai, 2002). “To halve, by 2015, 
the proportion of the population without sustainable access to safe drinking-water and 
sanitation” is also one of the environmental targets of the Millennium Development Goals 
(MDGs). Considering this focus on water-related issues, it is clear why partnerships working in 
this field make up the greatest fraction of CSD partnerships, covering a range of issues such as 
provision of drinking water, sanitation, urban infrastructure, irrigation capacity farming, and 
purification of polluted water. These partnerships introduce various technologies to the 
countries of implementation (CoIs) by technology transfer. Some of these technologies are 
built on the existing ‘indigenous’ techniques and aim at increasing their efficiency, whereas 
others are cutting edge techno-practices that claim to be more efficient in the exploration, 
extraction, distribution, irrigation, or cleaning of water.  
As the framework established by the UN documents has underscored the urgency of the water 
problems, the extent to which these technologies could be swiftly and widely implemented has 
been an important part of the (self-)assessment criteria. For instance, one partnership claims 
that before it existed the people “have organized themselves into so called ‘water committees’, 
building their own water systems in an uncoordinated, inefficient way (they lack technical 
skills and experience) [while with the partnership it would be possible to] build water systems 
[such that] each water distribution system will gather between 100 and 500 household 
connections (homes)” (Agua Para Todos, 2008). The preference in such cases appears to be on 
efficiency and the urgency of drinking water problems emphasized in the UN context, rather 
than the self-organising skills and choices of communities, a preference that may at times 
undermine the long-term sustainability of the partnership’s technology. The aim of this 
chapter is to examine this dilemma, and study how the package transferred by water 
partnerships, including technological innovations as well as accompanying social measures, 
relate to the legitimacy of these specific technologies and the technology transfer process. 
                                                          
1  Water, Energy, Health, Agriculture, Biodiversity 
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Water Governance under the United Nations: 
Linking Water Issues to Poverty 
Water scarcity has been causally linked to poverty in the United Nations (UN) sustainable 
development frameworks since the Rio Earth Summit, 1992. Agenda 21 devotes its Chapter 18 
to the protection of the quality and supply of freshwater resources, suggesting that the 
application of integrated management approaches to water would not only protect this critical 
‘resource’, but also alleviate poverty. To this end, the report suggests, “innovative technologies, 
including the improvement of indigenous technologies, are needed,” but does not further 
specify what kind of technologies are in line with its conceptualisation of sustainability. This 
ambiguity raises several questions, such as whether innovation as such is identical with 
sustainability, whether indigenous techniques actually need to be improved by modern 
innovations, and of course, whether all these ‘improvements’ can alleviate poverty on their 
own, and otherwise in combination with which other practices. 
Agenda 21 drew several parallels between water management and poverty alleviation, 
highlighting the vitality of safe water supplies for environmental protection and poverty 
alleviation in both urban and rural environments. In the so-called ‘developing’ countries, “soil 
erosion, mismanagement and overexploitation of natural resources and acute competition for 
water” were listed as the main reasons for poverty, hunger, and famine. This understanding 
was reified in the reports of UN institutions in the following years. For instance, a report by the 
World Health Organisation (WHO) and the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF) listed 
the effects of water problems as follows: “The combination of safe drinking water and hygienic 
sanitation facilities is a precondition for health and for success in the fight against poverty, 
hunger, child deaths and gender inequality” (WHO/UNICEF, 2004: 2). In the context of the 
CSD, these linkages have been reinforced, as is reflected in the statement that “in developing 
countries water is crucial for sustainable development and poverty alleviation” (CSD, 2006: 5). 
The assumption underlying all these statements appears to be that 'improved water 
governance would reduce problems ranging from water conflicts, to poverty, hunger, famine, 
health issues, gender inequality and improve (both) environmental conservation and economic 
development.'  
Six years after the MDGs were set, The 2nd UN World Water Development Report argued that 
the problems regarding water have reached a point of crisis, and this was “largely a crisis of 
governance” (UN, 2006). The same report made two important points: firstly, there was little 
improvement in water related services in sub-Saharan Africa and least developed countries of 
Asia since 2002 (ibid: 53). Secondly, “many water multinationals, as well as governments, so 
far have not been able to provide the type of technology that developing countries need” to 
meet the target set by MDGs (ibid: 72). In other words, the particular technologies required by 
the localities in question were not supplied; hence there was a huge demand for small-scale 
improvements. The report noted that the aid allocated to low-cost and small-scale technologies 
was increasing, and this should be further promoted together with integrated water 
management approaches. 
On the ODA side, allocations for water and sanitation have been relatively static at about 15 per 
cent and 8 per cent of the total aid respectively; assessments of water and sanitation plans 
suggested that aid flows were insufficient to reach the MDG targets (UN 2008: 10). More 
importantly, the share of aid for the water sector as a percentage of all sector-allocable ODA 
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was falling sharply from the 2000-level (ibid: 11). Although many water projects were in place, 
the success of these governance arrangements was not evenly distributed within and among 
countries (Martens and Deibel, 2008: 4-5).  
 
Legitimacy of CSD Water Partnerships & technologies transferred 
The literature review reveals that from the perspective of the MDGs and the UN, water 
governance has largely failed to reach its targets. The failure of water governance from the UN 
perspective however does not imply that partnerships as a mechanism of global water 
governance are an inevitable failure. Partnership are neither directly nor solely the responsible 
institutions for this failure, nor can it be assumed that water governance has been a failure for 
all stakeholders.2 The complex web of governance would not allow for such a simple causal 
relationship. Moreover, partnerships were intended as implementation mechanisms, and the 
legitimacy of the partnership regime as a whole was based on its potential to alleviate the 
implementation deficit.  
Regardless of their potential effectiveness, however, so far CSD partnerships have been unable 
to reach the MDG target on water. Conversely, they are nonetheless perceived to be more 
successful than other partnerships. According to the GSPD, more water partnerships (68.8%) 
generate output than partnerships on other issue areas (62.1%). They are also more 
transparent: 83.3% have a website on their activities and 37.5% have monitoring mechanisms, 
while for the rest of the sample these ratios are 75.9% and 22% respectively. Experts 
consistently evaluated water partnerships as more successful than others at key issues: On 
average water partnerships have been assessed more positively than others on filling the 
implementation and regulation deficits, in their ability to create new financial resources, being 
innovative and addressing urgent issues (Table 1). 
Table 1- Comparison of expert evaluations on partnerships on water versus other issues  
(Source: GSP Database) 
 
In sum, water partnerships are more successful than others while water governance in general 
is failing -even according to the UN sources. One reason for this differentiation may be that the 
MDG targets focus on drinking water and sanitation access, while the CSD water partnerships 
focus on a far more diverse set of issues. Thus, they do not all contribute to the effort in 
                                                          
2
  Indeed, while some water partnerships may have met their individual goals, it is the UN definition of 
water problems that was not solved.  
Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev.
filling implementation deficit 3,70 0,83 3,36 0,98
filling regulation deficit 3,96 0,65 3,57 0,85
creating new financial resources 3,70 0,81 3,18 0,96
creating innovative solutions 3,66 0,69 3,51 0,88
focusing on an urgent issue 4,22 0,70 3,80 0,89
filling participation deficit 3,53 1,10 3,27 0,95
Water Ps Other Ps
Expert Evaluation (Scale=1-5)
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addressing the MDG water targets, instead some of the perceived success may be related to 
those partnerships working on other issues, such as water pollution, hydropower, and 
irrigation. Furthermore, the discrepancy between achieving the MDG target and the success of 
water partnerships may be related to the global economic and political context in which water 
partnerships operate: Since the 1990s, this background is characterised by commodification of 
drinking water and privatisation of water and sanitation services in both Northern (e.g. 
Germany and UK) and Southern (e.g. Bolivia) countries. In this context, water partnerships 
have been invoked mostly as privatisation mechanisms (Finger & Allouche, 2002; Hall & 
Lobina, 2002; McDonald & Ruiters, 2005). Thus, to some extent, the perceived success of 
partnerships may be related to the fact that they are perceived as consistent with the current 
neoliberal  order. Conversely, private sector involvement in the water sector has been met with 
varying degrees of social acceptance, as it raises concerns regarding the affordability, 
accountability and equity of water provision (Hall & Lobina, 2006). 
While equity-related problems are an important dimension of legitimacy in water governance, 
there is no direct causal relationship between public and/or private involvement and social 
acceptability. Among CSD water partnerships, this observation is supported by type of actors 
that initiated the partnership: An overwhelming majority of lead partners are 
intergovernmental organisations and state actors, and not corporations or for profit 
organisations (Figure 1). When we examine the actor constellation of water partnerships, too, 
we find that state partners, non-governmental and intergovernmental organisations are the 
most frequent partners (Figure 2). Therefore, it would be difficult to suggest that CSD water 
partnerships overall are a means to further commodification, or a privatisation mechanism for 
corporations. Indeed, while some of the existing literature suggests that water partnerships are 
a privatization mechanism, they are also often seen as reflecting a ‘leftist’, participatory vision 
(Bakker, 2008), or even a merger of these two perspectives.  
Figure 1 – Sectoral Distribution of Lead Partners in Water and Other Partnerships  
































Figure 2 – Sectoral Distribution of All Partners in Water Partnerships  


















In summary, although the UN in general regarded water governance as a failure, the CSD 
water partnerships are not directly associated with this failure. On the contrary, especially in 
comparison with other partnerships, they were evaluated rather positively. The water 
partnerships under the CSD do not appear to be heavily dominated by the corporations, and 
are not regarded as privatisation mechanisms. Overall, CSD water partnerships are not 
suffering from a scaled down legitimacy crisis. Hence, they provide a useful sample to study 
the legitimacy of the technology transfer process. 
Another reason is that water partnerships are more often geared towards transfer and 
implementation of technology than others (Table 2). The basic assumption of this chapter is 
that it is not only the efficiency but also other characteristics of these new technologies and the 
technology transfer process, which determine their social acceptability in the long run. The 
choice of technology and the way it is implemented may have implications on equity in access, 
self-reliance in water collection, storage and maintenance (as opposed to paid external 
services), the extent of environmental impact, and whether the affected people are viewed as 
individual customers or as communities. In order to write an account of these aspects, we will 
not focus our attention on the consequences of each water partnership (this would be difficult 
as several partnerships are not yet completed), nor will we study their overall affect on water 
governance and institutions as other chapters in this book aim to do. Our focus will be the 
potential implications of the technology transfer, the features and the logical end results of the 
technology implementation for the societies they are transferred to. As indicated by Moriarty et 
al. (2004: 35) “Technology choice sits at the heart of a complex network linking needs, water 
and financial resources, skills and support structures”, at the same time the partnerships also 
maintain some flexibility during the technology transfer, to the extent that two very similar 
technologies have on occasion been implemented with very different outcomes. We suggest 
that an analysis of such interlinkages must focus not only on the implications of any given 
technology choice in terms of infrastructure costs, maintenance needs, operational models but 
also ‘what the technology choice brings to the communities’ in terms of autonomy, 
reversibility, flexibility, inclusiveness, changing patterns of social behaviour, and the extent to 
which communities maintain their freedom to self-organise in the future. 
Page|6 




Apart from the effectiveness narrative that justifies the partnerships regime in general, the way 
partnerships as governance mechanisms operate is justified by an assumption of democratic 
legitimacy, presumably achieved through the participation of stakeholders from different 
sectors and geographies (Mert, 2009; Bäckstrand, 2006). In other words, the participatory 
ideal of the UN’s development discourses also underlies partnerships: Since Agenda 21, 
partnerships have been understood as a way to include different stakeholders into the 
sustainable development project. However, participation is not so clear-cut a matter on the 
ground: The participatory principle is operative in partnerships only to a very limited extent. 
As long as there is a local partner from the CoI, the partnership and its activities appear 
sufficiently democratic. However, this is not sufficient to ensure the social acceptability of the 
technologies transferred. For example, any partner from the CoI can be regarded as a 
‘developing country stakeholder,’ even if this partner has no connection to the communities in 
question. Moreover, in some partnerships there are less local partners than there are countries 
of implementation; hence a local partner in Angola presumably represents all developing 
countries or communities across the world. The problems regarding the representation and 
participation are beyond the scope of this chapter. 3 It should be noted that the CSD framework 
does not imply a legitimate participation process, and in its extreme form it assumes a false 
singularity of opinion among all stakeholders in a community, all communities in a CoI, or 
across CoIs. Furthermore, the participation of any ‘developing country stakeholder’ in the 
partnership cannot be equated with a technology transfer process that is participatory. 
Transnational development aid in the form of technology transfer requires us to have a 
different approach. 
The UN governance platforms assert that more innovation is causally linked to better water 
management and to poverty alleviation (#), while simultaneously emphasising participation. 
Nevertheless they do not specify what is meant by participatory approaches in innovation, or 
the causality between poverty and these other factors. The assumption underlying these 
                                                          
3  Beisheim, et al. (2009: 6), for instance, observe that stakeholder involvement is more pronounced at the 
country level than it is at the transnational level, which includes “countries” as partners. See Schäferhoff et al. 
(2009) for the limitations of stakeholder involvement in general, and from developing countries in particular. 
Also see Campe (2008) for the specific details of stakeholder involvement in CSD water partnerships by case 
studies.  
Frequency % Frequency % Total
Water Partnerships 17 35,4% 31 64,6% 48
Other Partnerships 77 27,3% 205 72,7% 282





ambiguities appears to correspond to the critiques in the literatures of sociology, science and 
technology studies (STS), and critical theory, which aim to show that the structure of 
technology is not the main cause of social change. These critiques are based on a rejection of 
‘technological determinism’ (that the uses of technology are largely determined by the 
structure of the technology itself, and that technological advances are the main cause of social 
change). They suggest that technological innovation is influenced by its political, social and 
cultural context. The same is true for studies that critically engage with legitimacy of 
technological innovations. There are many examples in literature where the legitimacy of new 
technologies in one way or the other relies on a democratic legitimacy model (e.g. democratic 
rationalization work of Feenberg #: 210-212; democratic politics of technology as suggested by 
Sclove 1995). 
There are three problems regarding the application of these models on technology transfer. 
Firstly, these models assume that the more participatory the innovation or selection processes 
are, the more legitimate the resulting technology or product is. However, technology transfer 
operates differently: once the innovation process is completed and the resulting technology 
and/or products are installed elsewhere, it is only possible to appropriate the technology to a 
very limited extent, not to re-design it from scratch. While studying the legitimacy of 
technologies introduced by water partnerships, this assumption must be juxtaposed with the 
democratic deficit in transnational governance (i.e. in the formation of partnerships): 
Partnerships are vehicles through which a certain technological innovation is brought into 
societies that is neither produced by them, nor necessarily chosen by a majority of their 
population. As we noted, any local partner can act as the vehicle of official justification and 
legitimation for the new technology to be introduced. As we have also noted these projects are 
often initiated by IGOs. In this sense, many partnerships (particularly large-scale and high-
tech projects) have a top-down approach: Only a certain proportion or sector of the local 
communities e.g. local companies, universities, chemical or agricultural producers are involved 
so as to receive trainings and benefit from the technology. This kind of top-down installation of 
a certain technology is not necessarily undemocratic, but can neither be regarded as 
democratic. 
Secondly, while these models are based on a rejection of ‘technological determinism’, 
transnational technology transfer as such assumes that technological development determines 
social change. The interlinkages highlighted in the UN documents are manifestations of this: 
Transfer of technology is assumed to be able to solve all kinds of issues ranging from poverty to 
gender inequality. Our belief is that, at best, slightly more participatory technology transfer by 
way of water partnerships would negate the political nature of social change. It is therefore 
important to be cautious and specify in detail which aspects of technological change would 
potentially bring about what kind of social changes. Thirdly, these models are difficult to 
universalise in the context of technology transfer, particularly when the democratic context 
and background of the countries of implementation, or the accountability and participation of 
the transfer process cannot be guaranteed. 
Technologies are products of political and cultural negotiations of a certain context; when 
introduced into an alien one they are more difficult to re-negotiate. This is in line with two 
concepts (1984) defined by Bijker and Pinch in their seminal article “The Social Construction 
of Facts and Artefacts”: flexibility and closure. While interpretative flexibility refers to the 
different interpretations of a technological artefact among different stakeholders, design 
flexibility refers to the multiple ways of constructing technologies (reflecting the various 
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interpretations of stakeholders). In time, flexibility diminishes as closure takes place. This can 
be, for instance, a rhetorical closure: When the problem is perceived as solved, the demands 
for alternative designs disappear; or the artefact in the focus of conflicts can be stabilised 
through the redefinition of the problem, or by prioritising another problem it actually manages 
to solve. Closure is not a permanent state: new social demands can always cause a new round 
of debate or conflict about a technology, reintroducing interpretative flexibility. 
When a technology is transferred, the receiving society, too, has choices: it can accept, reject, 
or appropriate it. It is however almost impossible to return to the design stage, for structural 
and psychological reasons: the new technology is often either presented as superior or as the 
only immediate and present solution for the problem. Otherwise it might replace or disable the 
existing indigenous technologies. This does not mean that the interpretative flexibility 
completely disappears. However, in the development of a new technology interpretive 
flexibility would generate different problems related to the new technological artefact to be 
solved, different aspects or functions to be prioritised in the further development of the 
technology, before the artefact is stabilised. This does not happen in cases of technology 
transfer, as the rhetorical closure has already taken place and the design is already stabilised. 
The black-box of technology remains closed despite problems, often simply because the 
infrastructure for re-design does not exist. However, the design of the technology and the 
extent of appropriation is not the only issue that will be examined here – similar technologies 
are often transferred with differing accompanying ‘packages’, addressing issues such as 
education programs, pricing, job creation etc. These things may also have implications for the 
way infrastructure is implemented, even if design closure has already taken place. 
In other words, the water technologies introduced by partnerships might have effects on the 
receiving societies, as they cannot be negotiated extensively by all users or affected parties. The 
difficulty of re-design and re-negotiation turns the problem-solving and appropriation process 
(an extensive process of many adaptations, versions, negotiations, consultations etc.) into a 
success or failure factor for the technology, the partnership, or even at times for the society in 
question.4 So, a new framework that could assess the technologies in question in terms of their 
desirability, equitability, and plasticity, can better address the legitimacy question. In search of 
principles that would attend to the listed problems, we turned to the work of Ivan Illich, who 
suggested that the litmus test for the legitimacy of a technology would be its transfer to a so-
called ‘developing’ country. Illich’s writings on the perceptions of water (Illich, 1985), 
technology and institutions (1971, 1974, 1975), as well as development and ecology (1973, 1974, 
1978) have been influential on critical thinkers of technology, ecology, and development. But 
most importantly, his critique of institutionalisation allows us to scrutinise the aforementioned 
specificities of technology transfer undertaken by water partnerships. 
 
Framework of Assessment for Legitimacy of Technologies 
In his institutional spectrum, Ivan Illich (Illich, 1970 [2002]: 52-64) studies different types of 
institutions extensively. Institutions on the left side of the spectrum are enabling: they support 
                                                          
4  Throughout our research for this book, several policy makers asked us about the “the areas in which 
partnerships are least effective.” From a governance deficits point of view, building partnerships elsewhere on the 
basis of such information would further broaden the implementation deficits in areas with “most need”. See 
Chapter #  for the geographical imbalances of partnership projects.  
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users without intervening in established habits and lifestyles. Conversely, on the right extreme 
of the spectrum are institutions that are constraining and manipulative, for example by 
creating new needs that previously did not exist.  
These institutions include technologies and infrastructures as well. In particular, one idea that 
is central to Illich’s thinking is that many institutions and technologies reach a threshold, 
where they progress from supporting self-help and reuse, to negating their original usefulness. 
One example is transportation infrastructure (Illich, 1972: 141-2), which Illich presents as 
having undergone two watersheds. At the first watershed, automobiles and improved roads 
facilitated mobility. However, at the second watershed, the magnifying scale and scope of the 
technology leads to counterproductive results: in the case of transportation, the increasing 
focus on speed meant that smoother, expanded highways swallowed ever-increasing sums of 
tax money. Furthermore, the modern highway infrastructure began to dominate lifestyles, for 
example a farmer can no longer travel to the marketplace to buy or sell goods without taking a 
bus or putting the produce on a truck.  
Technology enters into an individual’s life almost always through advertisement of a certain 
product or artefact: this necessarily includes the suggestion that there is a lack, a need to be 
filled (Žižek, 2001). On the other hand, the institutionalisation of each product or technology 
discourages competitors. The same is true for communities receiving a new technology: 
Technology transfer comes together with advertisement campaigns, CSR and PR conducts, as 
well as trainings for users/supervisors and infrastructural investment that creates a certain 
level of path-dependency. According to Illich, an autonomous citizenry can employ a certain 
technology and appropriate it (even in case of technology transfer) on condition that this 
technology does not (1) manipulate the wishes of its users through creating a new set of needs 
(what he terms the creation of false public utilities), and (2) disable autonomous action against 
the cause of the perceived problem or obstruct subsistent or autonomous production of 
alternative solutions (the formation of radical monopolies). Otherwise, the appropriation of 
the technology by the community in question is impossible, because the technology “subvert[s] 
the very purposes for which [it] had been engineered and financed originally, [resulting in] 
paradoxical counterproductivity –the systematic disabling of citizenry. A city built around 
wheels becomes inappropriate for feet” (Illich, 1970 [2002]: 28). 
Counterproductivity is caused by the institutionalisation of technologies and economic models 
based on heteronomous production that ignore use-values. These can be called manipulative 
technologies, as their ignorance of use-values lead to commodification and manipulation of the 
citizenry through the creation of newly designed needs (ibid: 29-32; also see Illich, 1992). This 
understanding of use-value relates to Marx’s (1867 [1999], Chapter 1) conceptualisation of the 
term:  
i) when the utility of a thing is not due to labour, that thing can possess use-value without 
having value (e.g. air, soil, etc); 
ii) when labour is involved to directly satisfy desires and needs of the labourer, the product 
can be useful without being a commodity; 
iii) a commodity is only produced when the labourer not only produces use-values, but also 
social use-values (i.e. use-values for others) 
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iv) lastly, only objects which are useful have value, irrespective of the time and labour 
dedicated to its production. 
For Marx, someone who uses her own labour to satisfy her own needs is not producing a 
commodity, but only use-value. Illich (1970 [2002]: 31-33) focuses on the ability to satisfy 
one’s own needs as the critical factor separating heteronomous production based on 
commodification and autonomous production based on use-values: the latter has a quality of 
self-affirmation that professional production cannot satisfy. These two distinct production 
models can co-exist only to a limited extent, because 
“There are boundaries beyond which commodities cannot be multiplied without disabling their consumer 
for this self-affirmation in action. […] Only up to a point can heteronomous production of commodities 
enhance and complement the autonomous production of the corresponding personal purpose. Beyond 
this point, the synergy between the two modes of production, i.e. self-guided and other-directed, 
paradoxically turns against the purpose for which both use-value and commodity were intended.” 
This boundary is a result of the fact that commodities cannot completely replace use-values. 
From the viewpoint of the thing, which is the concern for Marx, a thing (or the labour involved 
in that thing) has no value unless it is an object of utility.5 From the viewpoint of the 
individual, which is the concern for Illich, there is a certain value in the process of putting her 
labour into a product: “Needs that are satisfied rather than merely fed must be determined to 
a significant degree by the pleasure that is derived from personal autonomous action” (ibid: 31, 
my emphasis). Beyond a certain point, commodities only serve the interests of the professional 
producer, while the consumer’s satisfaction is limited by her non-involvement, the disabling of 
her pleasure derived from autonomous production. Similarly for communities, Illich 
recognises the disabling potential of technologies that are suggested, transferred, 
implemented, produced and often maintained externally, by professional producers. When the 
community itself does not solve its unique problems, through its unique culture, its satisfaction 
is curbed.6 
Another factor that limits heteronomous production is the environmental impact of (“every 
form of”) mass production, including the mass production of services. But even if the 
environmental effect of the technology is minimal, its mass production would disable 
autonomous production (ibid): 
“Medicine makes cultures unhealthy; education tends to obscure the environment; vehicles wedge 
highways between the points they ought to bridge. Each of these institutions, beyond a critical point of its 
growth, thus exercises a radical monopoly. […] A radical monopoly goes further [than a commercial 
monopoly]: it deprives the environment of those features that people need in a specific area to subsist 
outside the market-economy.  [It] paralyzes autonomous action in favour of professional deliveries. [...] 
This radical monopoly would accompany high-speed traffic even if motors were powered by sunshine and 
vehicles spun of air. [...] At some point in every domain, the amount of goods delivered so degrade the 
                                                          
5  For an outstanding critique of Marx’s use of the term, see Hannah Arendt’s Human Condition (1958 
[1998]: 165-166). Arendt here notes that the older word, worth is replaced with “the seemingly more scientific 
term use-value”, which Marx also took over. Yet, Marx did not summon up the intrinsic worth of the thing, and  
instead by putting the function things have in the consuming life process of men, he ignores both 
objective/intrinsic worth and subjective/socially-determined value. 
6  This is also a starting point of Illich’s critique of development, and he surely would disagree with 
technology transfer as development aid. This makes his theory most appropriate to assess the legitimacy of 
technology transfer if one is to disregard the dominant urgency/efficiency discourses. 
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environment for action that the synergy between use-values and commodities turns negative. Paradoxical 
counterproductivity sets in.”  
Illich regards certain technologies (e.g. transportation by cars in highways, large-scale energy 
production, modern medical technologies) and institutions as the most extreme examples of 
manipulative institutions. Others, such as pavements, telephone lines, bicycles, small scale 
and/or subsistence level markets and industries are convivial ones. Most technologies and 
institutions lie between these extremes. Moreover, as institutionalisation of a concept, product, 
artefact or technology continues, it can move from left to right, from facilitating activity to 
organizing production. To highlight that technologies and institutions lie in a continuum and 
are mobile through time, Illich calls this an ‘institutional spectrum.’ The characteristics of the 
institutions that are at the right and left extremes of the institutional spectrum can be listed as 
follows.  
Page|12 
Manipulative institutions are characterised by: 
1. Manipulation of clients 
◦ The service is imposed; the client is subject to advertising, aggression, 
indoctrination, medication, imprisonment, electroshock etc. 
◦ The product results from highly-complex and costly production processes, which 
include expenses concerned with convincing consumers of their need of the product. 
2. Counterproductivity 
◦ They tend to develop effects contrary to their initial aims, as the scope of their 
operations increases. 
◦ Many assume a therapeutic and compassionate image to mask this paradoxical 
effect. 
3. Coercion 
◦ The rules that govern them call for unwilling consumption or participation.  
◦ Membership is achieved in two ways: by forced commitment or by selective service. 
4. Being either socially or psychologically “addictive” 
◦ Social addiction means the tendency to prescribe increased treatment if smaller 
quantities do not yield the desired results.  
◦ Psychological addiction is clients’ continuous need for more of the product. 
5. Inviting compulsively repetitive use 
6. Creating radical monopolies 
◦ Systematically frustrating alternative ways of achieving similar results. 
7. Creating a demand for false public utilities 
◦ Manipulating public taste such that a particular need is articulated into a demand 
that requires public services (which in turn boost their use). 
 
Convivial institutions are characterised by: 
1. Spontaneous use 
◦ They do not require advertisements to induce their clients to use them. 
◦ They exist to be used rather than to produce something. 
2. Being self-limiting 
◦ The rules that govern them set limits to their use, with the purpose of avoiding 
abuses which would frustrate their general accessibility. 
3. Amplifying opportunity 
◦ The service they provide is amplified opportunity within formally defined limits.  
4. The client remains a free agent 
◦ They tend to be networks, which facilitate client-initiated communication or 
cooperation. 
◦ They are often self-activated institutions. 
5. Serving a purpose beyond their own repeated use 
◦ They do not identify satisfaction with the mere act of consumption.  
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Our assessment framework based on Illich's critique of technology and his institutional 
spectrum can be seen in Table 3. This framework translates these core concepts into an 
assessment scale, which is used in the next section to analyse different technologies transferred 
by water partnerships. Our underlying assumption is that, if a technology creates dependency 
of the communities on the investor/initiator, or increases the existing inequalities, or disables 
other ways of organising for equitable water sharing or distribution, or frustrates indigenous 
technologies, its legitimacy is questionable. In other words, the legitimacy of technology 
transfer projects depends upon whether the project creates false public utilities, radical 
monopolies, and results in counterproductivity. If so, regardless of their effectiveness or 
environmental friendliness, their transfer should be regarded illegitimate. 
Accordingly, our assessment scale is based on a convivial-manipulative coordinate. On the left 
hand side of the table, the features of the convivial/autonomous institutions and technologies 
are listed, while on the right hand side we list that of the manipulative/heteronomous ones. In 
each box, there is a defining feature of such institutions (in bold script), followed by a list of 
indicators that might on their own, or in combination help us determine the extent to which 
manipulation, commodification, dependency, monopoly and coercion (or the convivial 
opposites) take place through the transfer of a certain technology. Some of these features are 
interrelated, and in the first instance appear repetitive, but as our assessment is not 
quantitative, we do not regard such overlaps as problematic. 
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Table 3 - Framework for Assessing Manipulative and Convivial Technologies 
Left (Convivial / Autonomous  
Technologies)   
Right (Manipulative / Heteronomous 
Technologies) 
 
1. Allows spontaneous use: 1. Is manipulative: 
a. Technology exists not as a service or a commercial 
product, but an opportunity to facilitate water access. 
b. Water provision and maintenance is without 
financial constraints. 
c. Initial infrastructure costs are low. 
d. Advertising is not involved as users need not be 
convinced of the value. 
a. Water provision involves complex and/or costly 
processes, the financial costs of which are passed on 
to the users. 
b. The technology and its maintenance are 
expensive. 
c. Advertisements stimulate demand, suggesting the 
service is necessary or irreplaceable. 
2. Is self-limiting: 2. Is counter-productive:  
a. The inherent characteristics of the technology limit 
its commercial viability. 
b. The technology limits overconsumption of water 
a. The technology has side effects that may 
contradict the original intentions.  
b. It is inserted, in the form of aid, assuming a 
compassionate image to mask its 
counterproductivity. 
3. Leaves the client a free agent: 
3. Is coercive / exclusive or creates 
dependence:  
a. Users have a right to the service, extent of usage is 
not defined by level payment. 
b. Users and communities are involved in decisions 
regarding implementation and maintenance of the 
technology. 
c. Users are essentially self-reliant, and responsible for 
use and repair of the technology. 
a. Users must pay for the service, or face exclusion. 
b. Users have limited or no input in the design, 
implementation and maintenance of the technology.  
c. Maintenance of the new technology cannot be 
provided by the community itself and requires 
professionals. 
4. Serves a purpose beyond its repeated use:  4. Has monopolistic tendencies: 
a. The aim of the service provider is not to expand the 
technology to other areas for the sake of market 
access.  
b. Communities retain other ways of accessing water. 
a. The aim of the service providers is to expand the 
technology to other areas in search of new markets. 
b. Customers have no option but to obtain the water-
related service or product from one provider. 
 
5. Creates false public utilities: 
a. The technology is propagated as a solution for the 
entire public, but is in reality only accessible to a 
certain (e.g. non-poor, non-rural) group. Public taste 




Assessing Legitimacy of Water Technologies 
The CSD Partnerships also employ the UN discourse on water, highlighting the interlinkages 
between water-related problems and all other social, environmental and developmental 
problems. Some of them focus on providing water for the poor or those living in isolated areas 
(e.g. WSUP – Water and Sanitation for the Urban Poor, PROASNE – Northeastern Brazil 
Groundwater Initiative, Agua Para Todos). In many cases, the link between water access, 
development and poverty reduction is explicitly mentioned. For example, the Global Rain 
Water Harvesting Collective relates its water access improvement aims not only to providing 
drinking water for the poor and isolated, but to enabling children to attend school instead of 
collecting water, to make communities less dependent, reduce water-borne diseases and with 
all this contribute to poverty alleviation. The Rainwater Partnership (2008) states that 
“rainwater harvesting has proved to be an excellent, low cost and simple technique in 
combating water related poverty in developing and developed countries” due to the access it 
provides to cost-free water. Similarly, the Desert Rainwater Harvesting Initiative (2009) states 
that it “is a grassroots project aimed at alleviating poverty by providing a reliable water supply 
to [remote populations].”  
This apparent consensus that water access in general would have positive implications for 
poverty levels, equity between and within communities, and environmental sustainability, 
inherently affects the self-reporting of the partnerships we study. As we depend on these self-
descriptions and reporting in our analysis, our goal is to distance ourselves from this 
assumption. The use of the assessment framework provided above would allow for a less 
partial study of the technologies in question, as it does not assume a relationship between 
access to water and reduced levels of poverty, inequality, and environmental degradation. 
When evaluating projects and technologies, the self-reportedly positive statements are thus 
naturalised to a large extent. Secondly, it focuses on the technologies rather than the other 
features of the partnerships, therefore offering a more pertinent analysis.  
 
1. Airborne geophysical exploration  
PROASNE is a partnership aiming to develop a more dependable water supply in northeast 
Brazil during drought. For one of its numerous projects, it maps the subterranean conditions 
in pilot regions to identify possible locations to drill through the rock and build wells. The 
technology to conduct this water exploration reportedly functioned well in the pilot areas 
(PROASNE, 2004a). The lead partners (Serviço Geológico do Brasil, and the Geological Survey 
of Canada) assessed the method to be successful after the pilot studies, in achieving the aim of 
mapping water occurrences. The outcomes were described by one partner as “nothing less than 
spectacular” although their replicability is limited due to high exploration costs (Maurice & 
Dumont, 2003: 2, 3).  
Airborne geophysical exploration is a highly complex and expensive procedure and the 
companies involved in its promotion (in the case of PROASNE) essentially have a monopoly on 
them. The advertisement opportunity seems to have been a key aim of the pilot projects: some 
of the actual and potential outcomes and impacts of the project that are highlighted are that 
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“Canadian companies win new contracts to carry out similar surveys elsewhere” and “Canadian 
companies offer services worldwide based on a genuine test case” (PROASNE, 2005). Even 
excluding the way the pilot projects were used, advertisement was a central part of the project 
in the form of education programs. According to the partnership website, “every project 
activity includes a technology transfer / capacity building component which involves training 
[...] provided through seminars, short courses, hand-on training in Brazil and in Canada, 
technical visits to Canada, joint project activities, long-term support of implanted technologies, 
etc.” (PROASNE, 2004b). The PROASNE executive evaluation acknowledges that there were 
several shortcomings concerning these seminars and training programs: the high cost of 
paying Canadian specialists to come to Brazil, meaning that they rarely stayed longer than one 
or two weeks, that there are very few specialists who were available for visits, severe language 
barriers, and lastly the unfamiliarity of Canadian specialists with the local Brazilian context, 
“making it difficult to address the problems directly without subjecting themselves to a lengthy 
learning process” (PROASNE ,2005: 55-6). While exploring water with this method appears to 
have been quite successful, it is not a guarantee for access to water. After a new source has 
been discovered using airborne exploration, wells must be drilled and water must be 
transported to settlements. Water thus becomes a complex product that is only accessible after 
a long chain of costly and complicated processes, for many of which the local communities 
become dependent on external support. As these observations indicate, airborne geophysical 
exploration has manipulative tendencies such as advertising, creating dependency, and 
monopolising the ways in which water can be provided. 
 
2. Solar pumping and desalinization stations 
This technology is designed to pump highly saline groundwater for un-electrified communities 
using solar power, and then make it potable through reverse osmosis.7 Special motors attached 
to solar panels provided the electricity for water pumps and desalinization by reverse osmosis. 
As the technologies are powered with solar energy, they seem especially suitable for small, un-
electrified communities. The partnerships associated with these technologies are PROASNE 
and the Global Rainwater Harvesting Collective.  
The PROASNE partnership also used these solar pumping and desalinization stations as 
advertising opportunities to gain access to new markets, taking the form of pilot studies which, 
among other things, aimed to create “commercial opportunities for Canadian companies and 
consultants” (PROASNE, 2005: 64). The high costs associated with the process can be 
prohibitive, and warrant a demonstration of the technologies’ benefits via advertisement an 
education. Indeed, one report suggested that the cost of exploring water using the airborne 
exploration method and then installing the solar pumping and desalinization plants in suitable 
areas so that it can achieve a “major impact” would amount to about USD 100 million (Maurice 
& Dumont, 2003: 3).  
A further counterproductive characteristic of this technology are the costs associated with the 
combined technologies. These not only severely limit its replication beyond pilot projects but 
                                                          
7  Usually, pumping and desalinization technologies are employed separately, but in the case of one CSD 
partnership using them, the two were linked and powered by the same energy source. As this is the case that most 
of the observations below are drawn from, the two technologies are discussed together here as well. 
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also the ability to make a substantial contribution to the provision of a more reliable water 
supply to northeastern Brazil in times of drought. The combined solar pumping and 
desalinization stations are so complex and difficult to reconstruct that monopolistic tendencies 
and dependence may arise because the technology cannot be built locally. In cases of problems, 
most spare parts need to be imported (PROASNE, 2005). 
Despite the manipulative characteristics suggested above, these technologies also have been 
appropriated by the local communities to a large extent, once implementation has started. 
Although initially the technologies were costly and complex, particularly because the solar-
powered motors had to be imported, in the case of PROASNE, these engines were altered in 
such a way that they were compatible with a type of pump that is manufactured and available 
locally (PROASNE, 2004c). In the case of the Global Rainwater Harvesting Collective, a solar-
powered reverse osmosis desalination plant was installed in India, and all except for one part 
of the desalination plant could be obtained locally. This indicates not only that these 
technologies were adaptable to local needs and constraints, but also a conscious effort to lower 
the costs for the end-users. Maintenance and repair by the local community is also possible. 
Maintenance of the solar devices is very simple, and for the reverse osmosis device a local 
partner was to be trained in the case of PROASNE (Jensen, 2001: 2). In the case of the Global 
Rainwater Harvesting Collective, a long development process for the solar-powered reverse 
osmosis technology lead to the development of a desalination plant “that could be managed, 
repair and operated by the community themselves” (The Global Rainwater Harvesting 
Collective, 2009). Thus, it seems that concerning the usage of these technologies after the 
implementation stage, communities have become more self-reliant depending on the goals and 
procedures of the partnership.  
 
3. Rainwater or rock water harvesting 
Rainwater or rock water harvesting is a simple, low-cost technology, which usually involves the 
construction of water collection and storage facilities made from easily available local 
materials. Rainwater harvesting exists in several variants, which differ according to factors 
such as collection and storage sites (rooftops, pans/ponds, subsurface dams, soil water storage 
systems) (UNEP, 2007: ix). Thus, different variants may be suitable to different local 
characteristics and rainfall conditions, for example some are suitable for dramatically 
improving the quality of water supplied (rooftop harvesting may prevent contamination of 
water where this has been a problem), or improve storage capacities in areas that experience 
extended dry periods alternating with excessive rainfall at other times. In addition to being 
very low-cost and low-maintenance, another convivial characteristic of rainwater harvesting is 
that it is self-limiting and reduces dependence on groundwater. In the partnerships we have 
studied, such as CWI, (in Kenya and Sri Lanka), the Desert Rainwater Harvesting Initiative 
(India), Rainwater Partnership (Sub-Saharan Africa and Asia), and the Global Rain Water 
Harvesting Collective (India, Afghanistan and several African countries), the technology 
transfer often involved small initiation costs. These partnerships highlight not only its benefits 
in areas where groundwater is scarce, contaminated or saline, and droughts are frequent, but 
also its environmental and financial sustainability (CWI; Desert Rainwater Harvesting 
Initiative, 2009).  
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Rainwater harvesting however may pose access constraints for certain parts of the 
communities, depending on the distance to and potential disputes over access to communal 
storage tanks. Concerning water and sanitation technologies in general, it is clear that “for the 
poor, the most dramatic impact of inadequate infrastructure may be less the result of lack of 
infrastructure per se but more the lack of access to that infrastructure” (Pouliquen, 2000), an 
observation that applies not only to access that is restricted by high prices for water and 
technology, but also when the location of a shared water supply is distant or disputed. This 
observations seems to continue to be of importance in particular in South Asia (where many 
Rainwater harvesting initiatives implement) and in Sub-Saharan Africa (where among other 
things the hand pumps discussed in the following section are implemented), as while in most 
other regions a substantial increase in the number of household connections has occurred 
since 1990, in these two regions the improvements often remained shared (WHO/UNICEF, 
2010: 25). While this may not be problematic, the data suggests that thus far it does still pose 
substantial obstacles for the poverty-reducing benefits often associated with water, as in “in 
many African countries, one third of the improved drinking water sources that are not piped 
on premises need a collection time of more than 30 minutes” (ibid: 28), a situation which does 
little to reduce the water-collection burdens of women and children and allowing them to earn 
an income or receive an education.  
According to the criteria defined by our framework, rainwater harvesting has a number of 
convivial qualities. In addition to their self-limiting quality, communities are involved in 
decisions, implementation and maintenance of the technology – their knowledge is 
indispensable to the projects. Regarding water quality and regularity the project designers 
require local help; the development and implementation of the projects are heavily dependent 
on communities that will benefit from these technologies. Accordingly, the projects involve 
different groups from communities, who are not seen as individual customers, and can 
appropriate the technology. Harvesting is usually free of significant financial constraints or 
advertisement, thus greatly contributing to spontaneous use. It is simple, replicable, and 
reversible. It is an inherently self-limiting technology (limited by rain fall) and enables 
communities to be as involved and self-reliant as possible: while it is not impossible to 
associate it with commercial use and service-based delivery, it is highly unlikely as it is not 
profitable. Communities can collect water themselves and are able to maintain and repair 
without having to pay or rely on external support. This makes harvesting favourable in isolated 
areas where both the availability of finances and adequate technical support cannot be taken 
for granted. It does not unnecessarily complicate water access with machines that need to be 
repaired, maintained, and controlled. All in all, rainwater harvesting does not seem to have 
manipulative properties as defined by our framework.  
 
4. Hand pumps  
Another low-cost technology, transferred especially to Africa and Southeast Asia is the hand 
pump. Although there are numerous types of pump-based mechanisms, (e.g. bush, rope, 
treadle, and fuel-powered pumps), the analysis below is based on the India-Mali Mark II hand 
pump, used by the West African Water Initiative (WAWI), which has dug (or rehabilitated) 
more than 1500 wells and fitted with hand pumps in Ghana, Mali and Niger (WAWI 
Secretariat, 2008: 13). Other types of pumps could be studied in a similar fashion, and would 
be likely to result in different levels of conviviality. In addition to WAWI, the Global Rainwater 
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Harvesting Collective, Community Water Initiative and Total Water Programme also use 
pumps, often in combination with other technologies.  
On the one hand, the particular choice of pump technology needs to fit the local setting (the 
groundwater levels, irregularities or limits of water supply etc.), which often means that any 
technology must be adapted to local conditions. But more importantly, the suitability of hand 
pumps is critically dependent on how it is implemented: for example, the cost for local 
communities associated with implementation and use might undermine its sustainability. 
Conversely, where water pumps are suitable to the context and financial capabilities, they may 
be a viable solution to improve long-term water access. Thus, depending on the approach taken 
by a partnership, the outcomes of a hand pump installation may be more or less convivial. 
One manipulative characteristic are the continuous costs. In a survey, it was found that the 
high costs curbed the hand pump usage: while 62% of villagers had at one point paid for access 
to the hand pumps, only 17% continued to do so, and 80% of water was taken from other wells. 
Other reasons were unreliability and the time it consumed to pump water (Gleitsmann et al., 
2007). The partnership that installed these hand pumps expected villages to contribute the 
equivalent of 175 USD per installation, furthermore in this case households desiring access to 
the pump had to pay regular fees and contribute to maintenance costs, which the villagers 
considered burdensome (ibid: 147). In this sense, the commodification of water was coupled 
with the treatment of the community-members as customers, resulting in high and continuous 
fees, and their exclusion otherwise.  
Despite these discouraging examples from one study, depending on the suitability of the hand 
pump technology and the way it is implemented, convivial tendencies are also possible. Hand 
pumps are particularly beneficial for the provision of access to safer water to isolated 
communities on a wide scale, without dependency on external products or sources. Hand 
pump variants are widespread technologies, they are easily available and inexpensive, and so is 
their maintenance. Most importantly, they can be applied in areas far away from urban 
electricity and water infrastructure networks, without forcing urban technologies on rural 
areas, or lifestyles of the rural or indigenous peoples. If implemented, taking these 
characteristics into account, hand pumps can be convivial technologies. 
 
5. Piped household connections 
In urban life, running water at your tap and shower is regarded as the most desirable form of 
water provision. The introduction or widespread use of this water technology was by no means 
obvious until the twentieth century. While its introduction to urban areas appear 
commonsensical to our modern day perceptions, it is also an indication of how dependent the 
modern citizen is on infrastructure. Hence, it is important to recognise that they may have 
manipulative outcomes for the affected communities, depending on the context of their 
application. For example, its desirability has been discussed in a study of the various attempts 
to connect the entire population of Jakarta to water pipes since colonial times: while universal 
service may seem like the most desirable option, the urban poor may nonetheless not wish to 
be ‘connected’ to hydraulic infrastructures which demand specific, constrained patterns of 
income, land tenure, and water use which may be far less reconcilable with their volatile 
income and legal status than buying water from informal vendors (Kooy & Bakker, 2006). 
While in the expansive megacities of the South the piped water supplied to richer areas is far 
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cheaper than the water sold through vendors and other informal channels in slums, one 
problem that has been observed is that the installation of regular pipes drives rent and land 
values up, and the original inhabitants out of an area (also because these technologies require 
legalisation and land registry) (Kooy & Bakker, 2006). All these points reinforce that this 
technology option is not automatically the most desirable, and it is important that all such 
possible implications are considered and addressed. Partnerships that implement this type of 
infrastructure are Agua Para Todos in Bolivia and WSUP in Kenya, Bangladesh, Ghana and 
Mali.  
Water pipe installation can be costly. What is often promoted as a universal solution may 
become accessible to only a fraction where the costs of installation are high, or where the 
constraints faced by users after installation are insupportable. However, partnerships 
implementing this technology have attempted to find ways to limit the costs for the eventual 
users. Among the most common approaches are identifying innovative tariff structures, 
income-generating programs to help users afford the service, and offsetting the cost of 
installation by contributing manual labour. For example, Agua Para Todos (2008) gives 
customers the choice of financial contributions or mixed financial and labour contributions: 
users can offset part of the cost by digging trenches and laying pipes themselves. Concerning 
pricing structures for the water consumed that might enable access for the very poor, one 
recommended solution are bloc tariff pricing structures where the first bloc is provided for free 
(Cleaver et al., 2005: 18), and the progressively higher prices paid for higher blocs cross-
subsidize the first level. WSUP is one partnership that relied on such tariff structures to make 
minimum water levels accessible the poorest community members as well (WSUP, 2008). 
Compared to flat-rate water prices, bloc tariffs have the added benefit of encouraging water 
conservation. Nonetheless, piped household connections are also a rather complex technology 
that creates dependence of users on external actors for maintenance and provision.  
There seems to be a readiness among partnerships providing piped water supplies to adapt to 
the often informal or even illegal situation of the inhabitants where they implement. 
Communities are involved in decisions regarding the final design in ways that enable them to 
reduce costs and allow for a communal water supply that is more easily reconcilable with the 
needs of the communities. For example, in the case of Agua Para Todos, communities could 
choose to have the piped water delivered to a community storage tank rather than having 
individual household connections, thus also lowering the price of the water and giving the 
community members a choice concerning the balance between type of access and costs implied 
(Steets & Heid, #: 3). Indeed, local involvement also seems to be a way for these partnerships 
to reduce reliance on external actors. This is best illustrated by the WSUP partnership, which 
indicates that the international companies and organizations involved in the project 
implementation will retreat once the projects are fully established and sustainable, handing all 
maintenance and billing responsibilities over to the local private sector (WSUP, 2004, 2009).  
A manipulative characteristic of many technology transfer projects is the inclusion of 
‘education’ programmes. In the case of WSUP, education programmes are also part of the 
partnership’s implementation plan, which may be a disguised tool for advertisement and 
business expansion. In the case of WSUP, it seems that these educational activities were mostly 
intended to increase awareness about behavioural changes that will reduce infection with 
diseases like diarrhoea (WSUP, 2008), however, full details on these activities are not 
available. Nonetheless, the possible manipulative characteristics are highlighted by other 
partnerships where WSUP partners such as Unilever also engage in “health education” (WSUP, 
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2007). Thus, a report by Unilever on another rural hygiene education partnership (Swasthya 
Chetna, translated ‘Health Awakening’) provides insights:  
“to grow in India in the 21st century will require us to extend the usage of soap beyond this relatively small 
group, to the 600 million Indians living in rural areas. For this to have any chance of success means that 
we will have to educate these people at the ‘bottom of the pyramid’ on why soap is important for personal 
hygiene.” (Neath, 2006: 3) 
Clearly, a secondary intention of these education programmes is for the company to extend its 
market access beyond the limited urban population. While the promotion of hygiene products 
can be easily coupled with running water, this makes the specific programme and not the 
technology itself manipulative. Piped connections often have convivial characteristics, suiting 
the lifestyles of the local population and reducing exclusion due to excessive pricing.  
 
6. Sodium hypochlorite disinfection  
While they are not directly related to water provision, water disinfection technologies also have 
implications for accessibility of drinking water. Partnerships promoting such measures are the 
CWI (in Sri Lanka) and Safe Water System (in Africa, Asia, Central and South America). 
Sodium hypochlorite is the most widely used water disinfection agent, providing point-of-use 
disinfection of potentially contaminated water. In these partnerships, it is coupled with a 
suitable carrying and storage device, and “behaviour change techniques” aimed at 
demonstrating the value of disinfecting water (Safe Water System, 2008). Disinfection is 
needed when there is no water infrastructure and communities rely on potentially 
contaminated water from ponds and wells, or where not everyone can afford access to the 
existing infrastructure.  
While SWS was only initiated in 2002, several of its members, including the US Center for 
Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) and Procter & Gamble (P&G), have been involved in the 
development of disinfection products and in a number of partnerships intended to promote 
them. P&G has been developing portable products to make existing water sources safe for use 
since the cholera outbreaks in the early 1990s, but the products had difficulties in becoming 
accepted by the communities they were intended for: attempts at using a filter were unpopular 
because it clogged fast, and sales of its first soluble disinfectant, PUR, remained low (despite 
proven record of reducing potential water-borne diseases and low prices) due to the taste and 
colour of the treated water (Hanson, 2007). Later, PUR was reintroduced through several 
partnerships “to test three marketing strategies: social marketing, commercial marketing and 
disaster and humanitarian relief networks”, and eventually succeeded at selling the product to 
non-profit organisations for humanitarian relief purposes: it seems that the partnership helped 
make this product commercially viable (ibid).  
Water disinfection products are also associated with much advertisement (often in the form of 
behaviour change or hygiene education) and advertisement-related costs. Indeed, if the 
partnerships to promote PUR are any indication, it seems that SWS’s “behaviour change 
strategies” might be considered a successful marketing strategy. The advertisement efforts of 
P&G in regard to making PUR commercially viable included employee campaigns (to buy PUR 
as donation) and introduction of the product to the NGOs working on disaster relief. Hence, it 
is difficult to argue that the advertisement campaign was to create a certain need that would 
manipulate the users, but rather the buyers. On the other hand, P&G’s strategy was not to limit 
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the use of PUR to such emergencies, but to make it abundant and accepted such that it would 
become a product of convenience in areas with water scarcity. It is in this sense that sodium 
hypochlorite disinfection approximates a manipulative technology. Despite the relatively low 
costs of the product, at least one study found that in Malawi the cost associated was considered 
prohibitive (Stockman et al., 2007: 1077). 
A convivial characteristic that may be associated with water disinfection is that such products 
are not associated with their own overuse or increased use of water; they simply make existing 
sources of water safer for use and consumption under extreme circumstances, particularly in 
disaster hit areas. Despite its simple application for the end-user, the users have no influence 
on the chemical design of the product, and it is universally applied instead of being customised 
for each particular disaster zone. Finally, despite its relatively low cost, at least one study found 
that in Malawi the cost of PUR was considered prohibitive (Stockman et al., 2007: 1077). 
Conclusions 
Assessing the legitimacy of technology transfer by CSD water partnerships by the new 
framework implies three sets of conclusions; about the framework itself, about the technology 
transfer process, and about partnerships in relation to these technologies. 
The assessment framework 
Convivial technologies run the risk of appearing less appealing than technologies that tend 
towards manipulation, such as piped water. This is mainly because they are small-scale 
projects which cannot be replicated universally, and more importantly, since they frustrate the 
image of bridging inequality that development aid often suggests. Nonetheless, when the 
results of our assessment with the new framework is checked against the existing literature we 
see that at least two studies supported the framework’s assumption that convivial technologies 
have higher social acceptability (Gleitsmann et al., 2007; Steets & Heid, #). Recipient 
communities prefer accessible, flexible, and free- or low-cost sources of water, even if access is 
less convenient over resources that are costly or that require frequent repairs by professionals.  
The choices of the communities appear to be influenced by a complicated web of factors rather 
than the price. In this sense, the assessment framework proved useful in enriching the 
dimensions on which poor communities and users make decisions. Agua Para Todos, for 
instance, demonstrates that the price factor is one among many: the local communities 
supplied with the pipes preferred to have the water in a communal tank from where they would 
purchase it individually, according to their needs and abilities. The price difference might be 
one factor here (US$0.25 per m3 versus US$0.45 per m3) embedded in a host of other social 
factors, such as fluctuating incomes, being able to rely on communal availability of water, etc. 
It proves to be a research bias to assume that the social acceptance of the technology by poor 
communities is solely determined by the price of the water provided (possibly because price 
information is easy to access for the researcher).  
On the other hand, the fact that the less appealing technologies tend to be more convivial also 
masks another issue that needs to be highlighted: while partnerships such as Agua Para Todos 
succeeded in extending water access to more users by lowering costs, this also involved 
compromising on the issue of communal vs. household connections, and relying on voluntary 
labour by the community to keep the prices low. What this glosses over is that in the same 
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urban area of implementation, official water utilities provide subsidized household water 
access to richer neighbourhoods, while leaving the poorer, less profitable neighbourhoods to be 
helped by partnerships and NGOs. Thus, “the creation of parallel networks entrenches the 
fragmentation of the water supply system, creating two tiers of service with vastly unequal 
levels of state support [...] in celebrating community resourcefulness, we risk condoning both 
government inaction and corporate misconduct.” (Bakker, 2008: 239). Perhaps the lack in 
legitimacy of technology transfer by some of the partnerships examined here is still rather 
insignificant compared to the failure of the responsible official public water utility or private 
concession to provide long-term sustainable water access in these poor areas. 
Other than these specific observations, the framework appears operant in suggesting the 
legitimacy (in terms of social acceptability and enabling of autonomous citizenry) of the 
technologies transferred. While including the economic dimension, it does not reduce this 
dimension to prices, and instead scrutinises the effects of technologies to the economic 
organisation of communities systematically. Moreover, the indicators also point to the 
potential systematic effects of a technology, rather than focusing on the effectiveness logic that 
is omnipresent in the development aid narratives of the United Nations. In this sense, the 
framework discredits the win-win argument that is at the core of technology transfer through 
partnerships. On the other hand, the framework gives mixed results when a technology has 
various applications, such as the hand pumps and the solar pumping and desalinization 
stations. Depending on the implementation the inclusion of communities in decision making 
as well as flexibility and price can change considerably in some of these technologies. In short, 
the framework suggests that some technologies (regardless of their application) are 
manipulative due to complex and expensive production and professional use and maintenance 
procedures, while others with mixed characteristics remain contingent on the application by 
the partnership. 
The technologies transferred8 
The analysis reveals sufficient variance among technologies that tend towards the manipulative 
side of the spectrum than the convivial end. What does this tell us about the different 
technologies? It is not that those on the convivial end are without faults, as we identified flaws 
not related to the framework with technologies such as rainwater harvesting. However, 
considering their impact on the societies involved and provision of access for the poorest 
sections, convivial technologies seem to fare much better than manipulative ones such as piped 
water or solar water pumping. Technologies such as rainwater harvesting are essentially tools 
for spontaneous use, the users of which define how they are used, and communities remain 
self-reliant in their water governance. These technologies are not associated with a strong 
potential for commercialization or service provision. Technologies where convivial 
characteristics prevail most clearly are rock and rainwater harvesting, while airborne 
geophysical exploration and water disinfection had the most manipulative characteristics. The 
rest (piped water, hand pumps and solar desalination) have both convivial and manipulative 
attributes, mostly because the outcome on one or the other side of the spectrum is in these 
cases heavily dependent on the way the project is implemented. The partnerships examined 
demonstrated that there is at least some potential for adaptation of the technology so that 
spontaneous use and self-reliance are likely (e.g. communities can take care of maintenance).  
                                                          
8  For a table summarizing manipulative and convivial implications of technologies, see Annex 1. 
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Furthermore, we do not suggest that piped water, for instance, is in every instance less 
desirable than rainwater harvesting. In areas where absolute poverty is rare, access to and 
payment for tap water is possible for nearly everyone. Neither is it intended to discredit the 
work of partnerships that transfer technologies on the manipulative end of the spectrum, piped 
water or solar pumps or even desalinisation projects appear to have been appropriated by 
some of the communities and even constructed locally.  
Partnerships transferring technologies 
The assessment framework assumes that heteronomous technologies provide services that are 
often not absolutely necessary, and as a result having to resort to manipulative actions such as 
advertisement to entice communities to invest in them, thus creating false public utilities. This 
was most obviously exemplified in airborne geophysical exploration, and in the non-emergency 
use of PUR. The costs associated with the promotion of these technologies limit access, not 
only making the technology an exclusion mechanism, but also indicating its 
counterproductivity as the aim appears to be (the universal) provision of water in the first 
place. For such technologies, partnerships offer an opportune platform: Even when their 
affects are contrary to their initial aims, these technologies can, through partnerships, assume 
a therapeutic and compassionate image to mask this paradoxical effect, which according to 
Illich is another feature of counterproductivity. The separation of end-users and buyers 
(donors) in the case of PUR was a strikingly effective strategy for P&G in this regard, while 
other examples are the use of pilot projects as advertisement by PROASNE and education 
strategies in general.  
 
Moreover, the technology transfer is assumed to be identical to ‘having water to drink’ which 
has implications for the implementation deficit in water governance. For example, in one case 
it was suggested that the key aim in the NGO head offices seemed to be meeting the WHO 
water quality standards with their technology choices, but they failed to adapt and implement 
it in such a way that the amount supplied could sustain an entire village (Gleitsmann et al., 
2007). The consequence in this case was that villagers continued to make use of more 
abundant water sources with lesser quality. Other than the quality versus quantity dimension, 
even when the number of people that gain access to water may increase as a result of these 
projects, their ability to initiate solutions to problems that they define themselves may 
simultaneously be curbed. The dependence of the communities on some partnerships 
concerning all design and implementation-related issues is an indication of this. 
Another role that partnerships assume in the process of technology transfer is more subtle, but 
equally important: They become a process through which flexibility reappears. In this sense 
partnerships may end the closure and the consensus over the technology in question (that took 
place in the society of origin), and re-introduce interpretive and even design flexibility. Even 
some of the technologies with some manipulative characteristics (such as piped water or solar 
pumps or even desalinisation projects) have been appropriated by the receiving communities 
and made locally constructable during the implementation process. The extent to which this is 
due to partnership organisation or the technology in question would be an appropriate next 
step in the development of our assessment framework.  
The promotion of a manipulative technology by a certain sector of the receiving community (or 
sometimes by external NGOs or governments) implies two things: Firstly, they mean that 
diverging interests have not been reconciled in the partnership process, although it looks 
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participatory. This can be termed the paradox of selective participation in partnerships, 
resulting from the assumption of democratic legitimacy based on stakeholder representation. 
Secondly, it indicates that preferences for a specific technology are often “hard-wired” into 
development politics even where more suitable options would be possible and available 
(Lowell, 2000, in Moriarty et al., 2004: 34). In this sense, partnering as a governance 
arrangement is transferred into the logic of the communities that are receiving development 
aid. As a business representative at CSD suggested: 
“Everybody is leveraging the others. […] What is your alternative? Your alternative is non-partnering, 
which, you know…doesn't sell well…”9 
Although this does not directly denote disempowerment of the communities in question, it 
certainly implies that partnerships become a part of the package that is transferred, which not 
only includes the transferred technologies but also the political and social arrangements that 
they are embedded in. Hence, inefficiencies and failures in partnerships can as well be 
interpreted as the resistance of the poor communities to the imported logic of governance 






















                                                          
9  Personal communication with business representative to CSD. 
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 -pilot projects serve as an advertisement opportunity 
-the technology is costly and complex, additionally 
further investments (into drilling etc.) are needed 







-adaptation to communities needs in price 
and construction is possible, users thus 
could remain free agents 
-self reliance may be possible where all 
parts necessary to construct/repair the 
technology are locally available 
-pilot projects serve as an advertisement opportunity 
-the technology is costly and complex 
-dependence continues where not all parts necessary 





--spontaneous use: no advertisement or 
notable financial constraints are involved in 
the projects 
-self-limiting: its inherent characteristics 
(no service or commodity) make 
commercial exploitation less 
straightforward and overuse unlikely 





-may be a tool for spontaneous use due to 
low costs, easy maintenance and adaptation 
to local conditions and that it can facilitate 
water access in remote areas  
-where it is cost-associated, the financial burden falls 
on users 
-dependence: where the design is not adapted to 
local requirements, hand pump breakdowns are 
frequent. Repair is difficult and maintenance 
requires outside help. 
Piped 
water 
-there is room for adaptation of the 
technology to local needs and requirements 
-costly process: water access involves payment for 





 -advertisement and education to convince of 
necessity, masked as “behaviour change techniques”  
-monopolistic characteristics, as only one company 
produces the product 
-dependence: users must buy new disinfection 
product regularly 
 
 
